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Meditations 2.11.4 · 2.11.4

Neither Good Nor Bad: The Indifferents Fall on All Alike

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θάνατος δέ γε καὶ ζωή, δόξα καὶ ἀδοξία, πόνος καὶ ἡδονή, πλοῦτος καὶ πενία, πάντα ταῦτα ἐπίσης συμβαίνει ἀνθρώπων τοῖς τε ἀγαθοῖς καὶ τοῖς κακοῖς, οὔτε καλὰ ὄντα οὔτε αἰσχρά. οὔτ’ ἄρ’ ἀγαθὰ οὔτε κακά ἐστι.

Death and life, reputation and disrepute, toil and pleasure, wealth and poverty—all these things befall the good and the bad among men equally, being neither noble nor base. So they are, then, neither good nor bad.

Word by word

θάνατοςthánatosdeathδέnowγεgeindeedκαὶkaìandζωήzōḗlife,δόξαdóxareputationκαὶkaìandἀδοξίαadoxíadisrepute,πόνοςpónostoilκαὶkaìandἡδονήhēdonḗpleasure,πλοῦτοςplou͂toswealthκαὶkaìandπενίαpeníapoverty,πάνταpántaallταῦταtau͂tathese thingsἐπίσηςepísēsequallyσυμβαίνειsumbaíneibefallἀνθρώπωνanthrṓpōnamong menτοῖςtoi͂stheτεtebothἀγαθοῖςagathoi͂sgoodκαὶkaìandτοῖςtoi͂stheκακοῖςkakoi͂sbad,οὔτεoúteneitherκαλὰkalànobleὄνταóntabeingοὔτεoútenorαἰσχράaiskhrábase.οὔτ’oút’neitherἄρ’ár’thenἀγαθὰagathàgoodοὔτεoútenorκακάkakábadἐστιestiare.

The setting

Marcus closes his catalog of the Stoic "indifferents" — death and life, fame and disgrace, toil and pleasure, wealth and poverty — arguing that because they befall good and bad people equally, none of them is truly good or bad in itself.

A note on this passage

This is the Stoic doctrine of the ἀδιάφορα, the "indifferents," stated in its bluntest form. Marcus lists four canonical pairs — death and life, reputation and disrepute, toil and pleasure, wealth and poverty — and grounds the whole argument in an empirical claim: these things συμβαίνει, "fall out" or "befall," on good and bad people without discrimination. If they were genuine goods and evils, they would track moral character; instead the same lot befalls a Socrates and a tyrant alike. The conclusion, "neither noble nor base," is therefore reasoned to rather than merely announced — a small but telling instance of how Marcus works through a doctrine instead of just reciting it.

The closing sentence tightens the logic with ἄρα, "then" or "therefore," marking "neither good nor bad" as an inference from what precedes rather than a restatement of it. The position is orthodox early Stoicism, close to what Epictetus sets at the head of his own Encheiridion — some things are up to us, some are not, and only the former admit of good and bad. Marcus's interest here, as through the rest of Book 2, is less taxonomic than practical: if these externals carry no moral weight in themselves, the weight falls entirely on how the ἡγεμονικόν, the ruling faculty, meets them — the same point he returns to at length in Book 4, where a rational being's good is said to lie in what it does with its own nature, not in what merely happens to it.

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