Phaedrus 269c · 269c

The Whole Is the Real Work

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Socrates — ἕκαστα πιθανῶς λέγειν… τὸ ὅλον συνίστασθαι…
Phaedrus — ἀληθῆ ῥητορικοῦ.

The imagined rebuke reaches its sharpest edge. The handbook-writers, having taught the preliminaries, 'believe they have taught rhetoric completely' — and the two things that actually matter, 'saying each of these parts persuasively,' pithanōs, 'and composing the whole,' to holon synistasthai, they regard as 'no work at all,' ouden ergon, something the students must simply 'supply for themselves.' The irony is withering: they have offloaded the entire art — persuasion and composition, the only things that make speech an art at all — onto the pupil, as if it were a triviality, while selling the preliminaries as the mastery. To say each part persuasively requires knowing the truth and the audience; to compose the whole requires the systasis, the organic putting-together, that the tragedy example named. These are not leftovers to be picked up on one's own; they are the art. Phaedrus concedes it entirely — yes, this is exactly what these men teach and write as 'rhetoric,' and Socrates has spoken the truth. And then he asks the question that turns the whole dialogue toward its constructive close: but what, then, is the art of the one who is 'truly rhetorical and persuasive,' tō onti rhētorikou te kai pithanou?

Word by word

Socrates
ἕκασταhékastaeach partπιθανῶςpithanôspersuasivelyλέγεινlégeinto say / to speak / to gather in orderτὸtheὅλονhólonthe wholeσυνίστασθαιsynístasthaito compose
Phaedrus
ἀληθῆalēthêtrulyῥητορικοῦrhētorikoûthe rhetorical one's art.

The setting

Socrates completes the imagined rebuke: teaching the preliminaries, the handbook-writers believe they have taught rhetoric completely — and as for saying each part persuasively and composing the whole, they treat that as no real work at all, something students must supply for themselves. Phaedrus concedes the point: yes, the 'art' these men teach and write does seem to be just that. But then, he asks, where is the art of the truly rhetorical and persuasive speaker?

A note on this passage

With Phaedrus's question, the long demolition ends and the construction begins, and the passage marks the turn precisely by naming the one word that has haunted the whole discussion: alēthēs, 'true.' Phaedrus does not ask about the rhetorician simply; he asks about 'the one who is truly, in reality, rhetorical,' tō onti rhētorikou — the real thing as opposed to the counterfeits just surveyed. The phrase 'in reality,' tō onti, is the same one Plato uses to mark the difference between being and seeming throughout his work, and its appearance here signals that we are done with the seemers and ready for the real. What the handbook-makers offloaded onto their students as 'no work at all' — saying things persuasively and composing them into a whole — is exactly what a true art of rhetoric must actually accomplish, and Socrates has been showing all along what it requires. To say each thing 'persuasively,' pithanōs, in the honest sense rather than the manipulative one, you must know the truth of what you are saying and the soul you are saying it to; and to 'compose the whole,' synistasthai to holon, you must have the compositional knowledge that turns parts into a living, fitted structure — the systasis that makes a tragedy a tragedy and a speech a living animal rather than a gaping web. Both of these, the persuasion and the composition, flow from the two knowledges the handbooks lack and dialectic supplies: knowledge of the truth of the subject, and knowledge of the kinds of soul. So the whole architecture of the dialogue's second half now stands complete and pointing forward. Dialectic, collection and division, was named as the method of the philosopher. The handbooks were shown to fail for lack of it — unable to define, they mistook preliminaries for the art. And now Phaedrus, taught by the whole argument, asks the right question at last: not 'what devices should I learn?' but 'what is the art of the one who is truly rhetorical?' The answer Socrates is about to give is the positive doctrine the entire dialogue has been building toward — that true rhetoric is psychagōgia, the leading of souls, and that it demands of its practitioner the two things no handbook can sell: knowledge of the truth, won by dialectic, and knowledge of the soul, won by a real psychology. The counterfeits have been cleared away; the genuine article can now be described.

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