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18a
The Apology of Socrates 18a · The judge's virtue and the speaker's18aThe judge's virtue and the speaker's
He finishes the request and states the rule he will hold everyone to, himself included.
· · ·
καὶ1
kaì
so
δὴ2
dḕ
indeed
καὶ3
kaì
also
νῦν4
nŷn
now
τοῦτο5
toûto
this
ὑμῶν6
hymôn
of you
δέομαι7
déomai
I askI need
δίκαιον8
díkaion
as fairjust
,
ὥς9
hṓs
as
γέ10
gé
at least
μοι11
moi
I
δοκῶ12
dokô
it seems tothink
,
τὸν14
tòn
the
μὲν15
mèn
indeed
τρόπον16
trópon
mannerturn
τῆς17
tês
of the
λέξεως18
léxeōs
speakingspeech
ἐᾶν13
eân
to let passto let be
—
ἴσως19
ísōs
perhapsequally
μὲν20
mèn
indeed
γὰρ21
gàr
for
χείρων22
cheírōn
worse
,
ἴσως25
ísōs
perhapsequally
δὲ26
dè
or
βελτίων27
beltíōn
better
ἂν23
àn
might
εἴη24
eíē
it be
—
αὐτὸ28
autò
itself
δὲ29
dè
but
τοῦτο30
toûto
this
σκοπεῖν31
skopeîn
to considerto look at
καὶ32
kaì
and
τούτῳ33
toútōi
to this
τὸν34
tòn
the
νοῦν35
noûn
your mind
προσέχειν36
proséchein
to turnto hold toward
,
εἰ37
ei
whether
δίκαια38
díkaia
what is justjust things
λέγω39
légō
I say
ἢ40
ḕ
or
μή41
mḗ
not
·;
δικαστοῦ42
dikastoû
of a judgeof a juror
μὲν43
mèn
indeed
γὰρ44
gàr
For
αὕτη45
haútē
this is
ἀρετή46
aretḗ
the virtueexcellence
,
ῥήτορος47
rhḗtoros
of a speakerof an orator
δὲ48
dè
and
τἀληθῆ49
talēthê
the truththe unhidden things
λέγειν50
légein
to tellto speak
.
so now too I ask this of you as fair, as it seems to me at least: to let pass the manner of speaking (for perhaps it might be worse, perhaps better), but to consider this itself and turn your mind to it: whether what I say is just or not. For this is the virtue of a judge, and of a speaker, to tell the truth.

so now too I ask this of you as fair, as it seems to me at least: to let pass the manner of speaking (for perhaps it might be worse, perhaps better), but to consider this itself and turn your mind to it: whether what I say is just or not. For this is the virtue of a judge, and of a speaker, to tell the truth.
Interpretation
so now too I ask this of you, as fair, it seems to me: let my manner of speaking pass (perhaps it is worse, perhaps better), and look at this alone, and turn your mind to it: whether what I say is just or not. For that is the virtue of a judge, and the virtue of a speaker is to tell the truth.
The opening ends with a definition, and it divides the work in the room. The jurors' job is to judge justice; the speaker's is to tell the truth. Style belongs to neither. Aretē, usually "virtue," means the excellence proper to a thing, what makes a knife a good knife or a horse a good horse. Socrates gives a short account of what makes a good juror and a good speaker, and leaves the jury to apply it. The last words of the opening, t'alēthē legein, "to tell the truth," pick up the first sentence's charge that his accusers said nothing true. The speech that follows tries to prove it.
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