Phaedrus 261a · 261a

Rhetoric Is Leading of Souls

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Socrates — ἆρʼ οὖν οὐ τὸ μὲν ὅλον ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἂν εἴη τέχνη ψυχαγωγία τις διὰ λόγων, οὐ μόνον ἐν δικαστηρίοις καὶ ὅσοι ἄλλοι δημόσιοι σύλλογοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ἰδίοις…

So then — is not rhetoric, taken as a whole, an art of leading the soul through words: not only in law-courts and every other kind of public assembly, but in private conversations as well?

Word by word

Socrates
ἆρʼâr'[question marker]οὖνoûnthen / thereforeοὐounotτὸtheμὲνmènon the one handὅλονhólonas a wholetheῥητορικὴrhētorikḕrhetoric / the art of the oratorἂνànwould / might (potential)εἴηeíēbeτέχνηtéchnēart / craft / skillψυχαγωγίαpsychagōgíaleading of souls / winning hearts / conjuring the deadτιςtissomeone / anyone / a certain oneδιὰdiàthrough / by means ofλόγωνlógōnwords,οὐounotμόνονmónononlyἐνenin / amongδικαστηρίοιςdikastēríoislaw-courtsκαὶkaìand / alsoὅσοιhósoiallἄλλοιálloiother / anotherδημόσιοιdēmósioipublic / of the people / communalσύλλογοιsýllogoigatherings,ἀλλὰallàbut / yet / well nowκαὶkaìand / alsoἐνenin / amongἰδίοιςidíoisprivate / one's own / peculiar

The setting

Having agreed that a speech must be a living whole, Socrates turns to the deep question: what is the art of rhetoric, really? His answer redefines the whole discipline in three words.

A note on this passage

Here is the sentence that saves rhetoric from the contempt Plato had poured on it in the <em>Gorgias</em>, where it was dismissed as no art at all but a mere 'knack' for flattery, cookery masquerading as medicine. The rescue is a single coined phrase: rhetoric is <em>psychagōgía dià lógōn</em>, 'a leading of souls through words.' Everything hangs on that noun. <em>Psychagōgía</em> was not a neutral term — before Plato it named the work of the necromancer, the <em>psychagōgós</em> who led the souls of the dead up from the underworld. Plato keeps the dark power deliberately: words really do move souls, the way spells were believed to move ghosts. What he adds is accountability. If speech is soul-leading, the speaker is responsible for where he leads — and cannot lead well without knowing two things he could ignore as a mere flatterer: the truth of his subject, and the <em>nature of the soul</em> he is working on.<br><br>Notice the last expansion — 'not only in law-courts… but in private conversations too.' Rhetoric is usually imagined as the loud public art of the assembly and the court. Socrates quietly universalizes it: any time words move a soul, in a courtroom or a whispered exchange under a plane tree, this art is at work. Which means the <em>Phaedrus</em> itself — two men talking privately about love and speeches — is a specimen of <em>psychagōgía</em>, and Socrates has been practicing on Phaedrus all afternoon. The dialogue names its own method. And the demand this definition generates — that the true rhetorician map the kinds of souls and fit the kinds of speech to them (271d) — is why the reformed art turns out to require the psychology of the palinode. The two halves of the dialogue were one inquiry all along: how <em>lógos</em> leads a <em>psychē</em>.

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