Phaedrus 271d · 271d

Know How Many Souls There Are

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Socrates — τὸν μέλλοντα ῥητορικὸν ἔσεσθαι ἀνάγκη εἰδέναι ψυχὴ ὅσα εἴδη ἔχει.

The one who intends to become a rhetorician is bound, of necessity, to know how many kinds the soul has.

Word by word

Socrates
τὸνtòntheμέλλονταméllontaintendingῥητορικὸνrhētorikònrhetoricianἔσεσθαιésesthaibecomeἀνάγκηanánkēnecessity / compulsionεἰδέναιeidénaito know / to have seen and so knowψυχὴpsychḕsoul / breath / life-principleὅσαhósahow manyεἴδηeídēkindsἔχειécheihas.

The setting

If rhetoric is the leading of souls, then the would-be master faces a hard prerequisite. Socrates states it as an absolute necessity — and in doing so binds the whole art of persuasion to the theory of Forms.

A note on this passage

This short sentence is the payoff of the definition at 261a, and it quietly detonates the ordinary idea of rhetoric. If persuasion is <em>psychagōgía</em>, the leading of souls, then no one can practice it as an art without a science of the thing being led — and Socrates states the requirement in the strongest word Greek possesses: <em>anánkē</em>, necessity, the must-be that even the gods do not fight. The rhetorician is not advised but <em>compelled</em> to know the soul. A knack for pleasing crowds is not enough; you must know what a soul <em>is</em>, and how many types there are, because (as the lines just after this spell out) each kind of soul is moved by a different kind of speech, the way each disease answers to a different drug. Rhetoric, done truly, becomes a branch of psychology — which is why the dialogue needed the palinode's map of the soul before it could rebuild the art of speaking.<br><br>And notice the two words at the sentence's heart, because Greek is making an argument English cannot hear. The soul's kinds are its <em>eídē</em> — the very word (with <em>idéa</em>) that Plato uses for the eternal Forms; to speak well, you must know the soul's <em>eídē</em> as the philosopher knows the Forms. And the verb for that knowing is <em>eidénai</em>, from <em>oîda</em> — which is the perfect tense of 'to see' (same <em>weid-</em> root as <em>eîdos</em> itself, and as English 'vision' and 'wise'). To 'know' the soul's 'kinds' is, in the grammar, to have <em>seen</em> its <em>looks</em>. So the demand made on the rhetorician turns out to be the demand made on the lover in the palinode: both must have beheld the true Forms and remember them. The craft of persuasion and the ascent of the soul collapse into a single requirement — real knowledge, which is recollected sight. This is how the two halves of the <em>Phaedrus</em> were always one book.

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