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Plato, Symposium 202c · 202c

You and I Say He Is No God

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Diotima — ὁμολογοῖτο μέγας θεὸς εἶναι παρὰ τούτων, οἵ φασιν αὐτὸν οὐδὲ θεὸν εἶναι;
Socrates — τίνες οὗτοι; ἦν δʼ ἐγώ.
Diotima — εἷς μέν, ἔφη, σύ, μία δʼ ἐγώ.
Socrates — κἀγὼ εἶπον, πῶς τοῦτο, ἔφην, λέγεις;
Diotima — καὶ ἥ, ῥᾳδίως, ἔφη. λέγε γάρ μοι, οὐ πάντας θεοὺς φῂς εὐδαίμονας εἶναι καὶ καλούς; ἢ τολμήσαις ἄν τινα μὴ φάναι καλόν τε καὶ εὐδαίμονα θεῶν εἶναι;
Socrates — μὰ Δίʼ οὐκ ἔγωγʼ, ἔφην.
Diotima — εὐδαίμονας δὲ δὴ λέγεις οὐ τοὺς τἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ καλὰ κεκτημένους;
Socrates — πάνυ γε.

could he be agreed to be a great god by those who say he is not even a god? Who are these? said I. One, she said, are you, and one am I. And I said: how, do you mean, this? And she: easily, she said. Tell me now, do you not say all gods are happy and beautiful? Or would you dare to deny of any that a god is beautiful and happy? By Zeus, not I, I said. And do you call happy not those who possess good and beautiful things? Quite so.

Word by word

Diotima
ὁμολογοῖτοhomologoîtocould he be agreedμέγαςmégasa greatθεὸςtheòsgodεἶναιeînaito beπαρὰparàbyτούτωνtoútōnthose,οἵhoíwhoφασινphasinsayαὐτὸνautònheοὐδὲoudèis not evenθεὸνtheòna godεἶναιeînaito be;
Socrates
τίνεςtíneswhoοὗτοιhoûtoiare these;ἦνênsaidδʼdʼbut / and / howeverἐγώegṓI.
Diotima
εἷςheîsoneμένménon the one hand,ἔφηéphēshe said,σύsýare you,μίαmíaoneδʼdʼbut / and / howeverἐγώegṓam I.
Socrates
κἀγὼkʼagṑAnd Iεἶπονeîponsaid,πῶςpôshowτοῦτοtoûtothis,ἔφηνéphēnI said,λέγειςlégeisdo you mean;
Diotima
καὶkaìAndἥhḗshe,ῥᾳδίωςrhāidíōseasily,ἔφηéphēshe said.λέγεlégetellγάρgárnowμοιmoime,οὐounotπάνταςpántasallθεοὺςtheoùsgodsφῂςphḕisdo you sayεὐδαίμοναςeudaímonashappyεἶναιeînaito beκαὶkaìandκαλούςkaloúsbeautiful;ἢḕorτολμήσαιςtolmḗsaiswould you dareἄνánwould / might (potential)τιναtinaany oneμὴmḕnotφάναιphánaito denyκαλόνkalónbeautifulτεteand (intimate linking)καὶkaìandεὐδαίμοναeudaímonahappyθεῶνtheônof the godsεἶναιeînaito be;
Socrates
μὰmàbyΔίʼDíʼZeusοὐκouknotἔγωγʼégōgʼI for one,ἔφηνéphēnI said.
Diotima
εὐδαίμοναςeudaímonashappyδὲdèandδὴdḕindeed / thenλέγειςlégeisdo you callοὐounotτοὺςtoùstheτἀγαθὰtagathàgood thingsκαὶkaìandτὰtàtheκαλὰkalàbeautiful thingsκεκτημένουςkektēménousthose who possess;
Socrates
πάνυpánuquiteγεgeso.

The setting

Diotima springs the trap. How could Eros be agreed a great god by people who say he is not even a god at all? Who are they, asks Socrates. One is you, she says, and one is I. She shows him: you say all gods are happy and beautiful, and that the happy are those who possess good and beautiful things. Socrates agrees to each step.

A note on this passage

This is the elenchus reaching its own author. Socrates is shown holding, unnoticed, premises that jointly deny Eros' divinity — so he himself, on reflection, does not really count Eros a god. Diotima's method is exactly his: draw the admissions one by one, then let them collide. The Greek link of happiness to possession — eudaimonia as having the good — is the ordinary Greek picture Diotima will use to place Eros outside the company of gods. A god has the good and so does not desire it; Eros desires it and so lacks it. The conclusion, which lands in 202d, is that Eros is not a god at all, but a daimon, the great in-between — and that the crowd's worship rests on not having thought it through.

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Plato, Symposium 202c — The Great Library Project interlinear edition · greatlibraryproject.com/book/symposium/202c/