Two Readinesses
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Δύο ταύτας ἑτοιμότητας ἔχειν ἀεὶ δεῖ· τὴν μὲν πρὸς τὸ πρᾶξαι μόνον ὅπερ ἂν ὁ τῆς βασιλικῆς καὶ νομοθετικῆς λόγος ὑποβάλλῃ ἐπʼ ὠφελείᾳ ἀνθρώπων· τὴν δὲ πρὸς τὸ μεταθέσθαι, ἐὰν ἄρα τις παρῇ διορθῶν καὶ μετάγων ἀπό τινος οἰήσεως. τὴν μέντοι μεταγωγὴν ἀεὶ ἀπό τινος πιθανότητος, ὡς δικαίου ἢ κοινωφελοῦς, γίνεσθαι καὶ τὰ προηγμένα τοιαῦτα μόνον εἶναι δεῖ, οὐχ ὅτι ἡδὺ ἢ ἔνδοξον ἐφάνη.
One must always keep these two readinesses at hand: the one, to do only what the reason of the kingly and legislative faculty suggests for the benefit of men; the other, to change one’s course, if after all someone is at hand to set one right and redirect one from some opinion. But the change must always proceed from some plausible ground — that the new course is just or of common benefit — and the preferred motives must be only of that kind, not because the thing appeared pleasant or well-regarded.
Hold two dispositions at once: to act on what your own ruling reason legislates for the good of others, and to change course when honestly corrected — but only for a sound reason, never because a course looked pleasant or admired.
Marcus prescribes a balance between two virtues that can seem to pull against each other: firmness and openness to correction. The first ἑτοιμότης, readiness, is to act only on what the "kingly and legislative reason" prescribes — his image for the ruling faculty functioning as one’s own sovereign and lawgiver — and always ἐπ᾽ ὠφελείᾳ ἀνθρώπων, for the benefit of others. The second is the willingness to μεταθέσθαι, to shift position, when someone genuinely corrects a mistaken οἴησις, a mere opinion one had been holding. Conviction without teachability hardens into obstinacy; teachability without conviction dissolves into drift. Marcus wants both.
The crucial safeguard is in the second half: a change of course must come ἀπό τινος πιθανότητος, from some real ground of persuasion — that the new course is just (δίκαιον) or serves the common good (κοινωφελές) — and the motives that may properly move one, the προηγμένα, must be of that kind only. What must never move him is that a thing looked ἡδύ or ἔνδοξον, pleasant or well-thought-of. So the openness he recommends is not a susceptibility to flattery or appetite but a strict responsiveness to reason. The undercurrent is the ideal of the self-governing mind: it legislates for itself, revises itself, but only ever on grounds it can justify.
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